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The Untermensch as Ubermensch
William Ian Miller, Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social
Discomfort, and Violence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. xii,
270. $25.00.

Paul Campos

I
Recently, I was given a curious gift: a compact disc, entitled Golden
Throats: The Great Celebrity Sing-Off,' that contains a compilation of bad
cover versions of famous rock and pop songs. These are not ordinary bad
cover versions, however-e.g., Frank Sinatra crooning "Bad, Bad Leroy
Brown," or Tony Bennet belting out an unctuous version of "Moondance."
These cover versions defeat the resources of English critical prose. They
are indescribably bad. Imagine Mr. French himself, Sebastian Cabot,
"singing" Bob Dylan's "It Ain't Me Babe," or a geriatric and apparently
demented Mae West shrieking her way through "Twist and Shout." Picture,
if you can, Captain James T. Kirk of the Starship Enterprise violating every
conceivable artistic prime directive via his interpretations of "Lucy in the
Sky with Diamonds" or-a personal favorite-"Mr. Tambourine Man."
Golden Throats, which was put together by some evil genius at the
invaluable Rhino Records (2225 Colorado Blvd., Santa Monica, CA), has
become an after-dinner party favorite among those of my friends who share
a certain perverse sense of humor. But why do we delight in these quite
literally incredible performances? Answering this sort of question is a
central concern of William Ian Miller's remarkable and fascinating book,
Humiliation.2

1.
2.

GOLDEN THROATS: THE GREAT CELEBRITY SING-OFF (Rhino Records).
WILLIAM I. MILLER, HUMILIATION: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND

VIOLENCE (1993).

Miller is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and notes that "[b]y
training I am a literary critic and philologist, by profession I have become a historian of medieval
Iceland. By employment I am a law professor and teach traditional courses in law in addition to
courses in line with the themes of this book." Id. at xi. We can indulge in a bit of Schadenfreude (a
major theme of the book) by imagining how this passage would enrage the likes of Judge Harry
Edwards. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 6: 423

Humiliationis a collection of five essays that touch upon a vast panoply
of subjects: the heroic saga literature of medieval Iceland, the intricate
social mores of contemporary American academics, the sociological
analysis of gift exchange, the anthropology of violence, and the linguistic
genealogy of human emotions are just some of the topics that engage the
author's eclectic intelligence. A single broad theme links up these narrative
threads. Professor Miller is undertaking an archaeology of the self, an
attempt to describe and historicize those emotions-shame, humiliation,
embarrassment-"which maintain us as self-respecting and respectable
social actors."'3 The book is a cross-cultural study of the strategies of selfpresentation which human beings employ to avoid the often excruciating
sensations that accompany the loss of status, or that mark the sudden
deflation of their pretensions to a status they have not achieved.
When we consider the phenomenon exemplified by Golden Throats,
Miller's account of contemporary emotional life helps us to understand the
very existence of such a bizarre artifact in a number of ways. First, the
pleasure of listening to these songs is partly the pleasure of a delicious sort
of embarrassment. These inept attempts at musical performance by
nonmusical pop culture celebrities create in many listeners the vicarious
sense of how the listener would feel if he were to expose his own
inadequacies in such a public way. As Miller puts it, "[w]hen you
experience [embarrassment] vicariously, you are imagining yourself in the
position of the other and feeling her embarrassment as if you were her."4
Second, we are pleasurably embarrassed because we perceive that these
performers are humiliating themselves in a fashion that implicates all the
dark comedy surrounding that particular emotion: "Our own embarrassment
is often our best indication that we have judged others to be humiliating
themselves." 5 The unfortunate Leonard Nimoy singing "If I Had a
Hammer" in a monotone, or Andy Griffith preening as rock star manque
on "The House of the Rising Sun"-what better examples could be
adduced of Miller's dictum that humiliation is what befalls us when we
pretend to a status we have not achieved? And what of the real musicians
who took part in these aesthetic atrocities now sealed within the digitized
memory of a compact disc? Here a different set of emotions may well
come into play, those that surround the word shame. How can serious
musicians adequately rationalize participating in such travesties of their art?
Have they not, perhaps, violated fundamental norms of honorable behavior
among artists?

Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
3.

MILLER, supra note 2, at ix.

4. Id. at 155.
5. Id.
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These are the kinds of seriously underinvestigated social phenomena with
which Humiliation grapples. The book's intense focus on the actual
instantiation of various forms of shame, humiliation, and embarrassment in
human social life is exemplified by Miller's subtle analysis of the startling
vignette with which he begins his narrative. Miller's central theme is that
such apparently trivial social interactions are repositories of meaning that
we can mine to help us better understand what it is to be a person. Miller
presents the following true story:
Imagine hosting a get-together for a group of twelve. You have
stocked up on food and drink, and because not a few of the members
of the group are lusty drinkers, the drink alone represents a considerable expenditure. The time comes for the guests to arrive. No one
appears. But no one is ever quite on time. More time passes; finally,
one person shows. It is your friend in the group, the person who had
introduced you into it, and the only person in it who up until then had
not been an utter stranger to you. Now you both sit and wait. Did you
forget to tell them the right time, the right day? The lateness passes
beyond fashionableness, heading toward inconsiderateness and beyond
into something more ominously disconcerting. At last a phone call. It
is from a woman in the group, a lawyer, a toughminded, no-nonsense
person. She tells you simply that people have decided not to come
(they preferred watching the regional finals of the NCAA basketball
tournament, she says, at her house; sorry for the inconvenience; you
can come over if you like; good-bye). How would you feel? What did
you ever do to deserve that?'
This grim parable is subjected to a detailed and convincing interpretation
that strives to answer both questions posed by the author. The reader is
treated to a story of social ineptitude and academic boorishness that proved
immune to the normal disciplinary regime of the upper-middle class
intelligentsia-"ignoring, eye-aversion, verbal put-downs, interruptions,
dismissively short answers to his questions, using his name in direct
address excessively or not at all" 7 -- and which eventually provoked a
communal act of genteel savagery that permanently ostracized the offender
from the avenging group.
No one who has read Foucault's Discipline and Punish ever forgets the
gruesome account of the public torture-execution with which the book
begins,8 but I would wager that, for a contemporary academic reader,
Miller's initial narrative is in fact quite a bit more disturbing. Foucault,
after all, is describing an almost fantastic scene from a faraway place, and
the outlandish "barbarisms" of such odd people inevitably seem to have

6. Id.at I.
7. Id.at 3.
8. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3-6 (1979).
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little enough to do with us. By contrast, the shaming ritual in which Miller
participated, and which he uses to immerse us in our own world of social
discipline and punishment, strikes much closer to home.
The dark comedy of the "Introduction" prepares us for Miller's acute
exploration of the wonderfully complex world of social meaning that
inheres in the most quotidian rituals. The essay "Requiting the Unwanted
Gift" builds upon the work of Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu9 to
construct a hermeneutics of contemporary gift exchange, one that
demonstrates how the apparently archaic codes of honor cultures, where
insults are often perceived as (negative) gifts, and gifts can easily be
construed as insults, still provide a kind of rumbling subtext to our more
"innocent" gratuities. The rich texture of Miller's analysis comes through
in this extended quotation:
Invitations to dinner have a logic of their own.... There are surely
elements of potlatch or competitive gift exchange here. Among those
who care about such things, being known as a good cook is not quite
enough. One needs to be recognized as a better cook than the guest,
if, that is, the guest pretends to a similar competence. An invitation
to dinner from serious cooks has then something of the aspect of a
challenge. But the challenge has different consequences depending on
the guest. To guests who like playing that game, the chance to
reciprocate is simply a part of the game, and the only anxieties
generated are the usual ones in a clearly bounded contest. For those
guests, however, who recognize a good meal when they see it but who
also do not care to spend time on such things, the invitation generates
real anxieties, the anxieties associated with how to reciprocate
adequately. How in the world can one reciprocate and still not feel
beholden? Whatever one serves will be plebeian fare as far as they
are concerned. Nor can one solve the problem by taking them out to
a good restaurant, for to take that course is an admission of moral
failure, a blatant attempt to do with money what should have been
done with the soul. One either must remain forever beholden or find
some adequate way to excuse the inadequacy of the return....
... What is clear is that invitations to dinner, if status, age, or familial
conditions do not prevent it, raise the obligation to reciprocate as
clearly as such an obligation can be raised in the world of gifts. And
the reciprocation must be by return invitation unless one is able to do
some very fancy maneuvering.'
What is being traced here is that secret economy of obligation whose rough
contours we all dimly perceive, but which remains resistant to modern
utilitarian analysis. The quasi-official ideology of gift-giving-that no

9. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES
(1967); PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977).
10.

MILLER, supra note 2, at 25-27.
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return is required"-co-exists in tension with our subterranean loyalty to
the ancient claims of universal reciprocation:
"Gifts are obligation-creating,
2
more viscerally so than contracts."'
Miller's analysis of gifts takes in such amusing phenomena as the bridal
registry, the gift shop (which exists to purvey "those objects that proclaim
their status as gift"), and the continuously circulating gift that keeps on
giving.' 3 All of these practices are subjected to the most exacting
particularist inquiry, yet Miller is also interested in analyzing them as
theory-laden social games. Indeed, an interesting tension that runs through
both this essay and the book as a whole is the mingling of a fascination
with the game-theoretic qualities of social exchange with a distrust of, and
even a disdain for, the reductive formalism of positivist social science.' 4
Humiliation can be read as a highly original attempt to work toward
deploying something like the analytical power of game theory models upon
the fantastically complex empirical situations that these models might
actually address, but rarely do.
II
For most legal academics, the essay "Getting a Fix on Violence" is the
most clearly relevant part of Miller's book. It marks an important advance
in the still-nascent (in the legal academy, anyway) discourse most
commonly associated with Robert Cover's work: how we see or fail to see
violence, especially the violence of the state. 15 Miller again undertakes
an intensely particularist account of how we interpret the whole spectrum
of those acts that are or can be recognized as violent, from the least

11. See JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNER'S GUIDE FOR THE TURN-OF-THE-MILLENNIUM (1990).

12. MILLER, supra note 2, at 17.
13. Miller's distinguished predecessor in the study of medieval Northern European literatures, J.R.R.
Tolkien, was also fascinated by gift-giving practices, and he incorporated that interest into the fantastic
kingdoms of his fiction:
[A]nything that Hobbits had no immediate use for, but were unwilling to throw away, they called
a mathom. Their dwellings were apt to become rather crowded with mathoms, and many of the
presents that passed from hand to hand were of that sort ...there were one or two old mathoms
of forgotten uses that had circulated all round the district.
J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS 14, 46 (1977).
14. Although Miller himself does not employ formal game theory concepts in the course of his
analysis, many of the social exchanges he narrates can be understood in those terms. Consider the
narrative quoted infra page 432. If Miller were to encounter a similarly situated academic who did
remember him, the two professors would face a variation of the famous "prisoner's dilemma." That is,
each would consider the best outcome to be one in which he would treat the other with a "friendly"
condescension that the other would accept as an appropriate expression of his/her relative hierarchical
status. The worst outcome would be for both academics to treat each other with the former attitude, as
this might lead to open conflict. Paradoxically, the best outcome for both as a group would be for each
to display an egalitarian familiarity that, when displayed unilaterally, would leave either open to the
crushing condescension of the hierarchical response, since this response can plausibly treat egalitarian
familiarity as appropriate deference. For a good introduction to game theory, see WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1992).

15.

See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
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ambiguous ("where fist meets face") to the absurd rhetorical excesses of
certain poststructuralist strands of literary criticism, which describe reading
and writing as essentially "violent" acts.
Again, Miller's account insists upon the socially constructed, perspectival
quality of "violence." What does it mean, he asks, to declare one society
more or less violent than another? Clearly, he is attracted to Foucault's
skepticism concerning the supposedly inexorable march of progress, and his
enormous range of cross-cultural examples only emphasizes the "hydralike" quality of the subject. His idiosyncratic and complex approach leads
the reader to question any complacent dichotomizations of victims and
victimizers, of violence and the "mere" threat of violence, and of coercion
and consent.
Some of the anthropological examples Miller uses to emphasize his
points will strike the lay reader as bizarre. Consider the Gebusi of New
Guinea, who by almost all conventional definitions seem to have constructed an utterly "nonviolent" culture. Nevertheless, the Gebusi have the
world's highest recorded homicide rate-a manifestation of their belief that
all deaths from illness are caused by witchcraft, thus requiring the
immediate killing of the guilty party.
Odd as the beliefs of the Gebusi may appear, we cannot ignore the
contradiction-laden manner in which our own culture constructs and defines
the "violent." A recent study that used college students to grade various
acts of television violence found that the students saw kicking the door
down with a weapon as a violent act, that is, unless the kicker was a police
officer, in which case the act was not violent, unless the police officer had
no badge, in which case it was. Acts of physical destruction against a
corpse were violent, but only 6if the actor was not the same person who did
the killing in the first place.'
In the same spirit of cross-cultural skepticism, Humiliation asks us to
compare a formal dinner party in the world chronicled by Henry James,
where using the wrong fork could have disastrous social and even moral
consequences, with a thirteenth-century feast in an English lord's hall,
where apparently "you could belch, pass gas, wheeze and hack, spit, vomit,
and blow your nose in your hand and your status remained secure." Yet "if
someone tripped over your foot, tempers rose and serious violence could
occur."17 Such comparisons emphasize Miller's insistence on asking the
question that should trouble the Whig histories of all modem progressive
ideologues: How does the intermittent experience of anarchic, pre-industrial
violence compare with the continuous saturation of anxiety into every
crevice of the contemporary social Panopticon? This question remains

16.
17.

The Producers, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 13, 1993, at 14.
MILLER, supra note 2, at 200.

1994]

Campos

especially germane in the legal academy, where the violence of the state
remains so obscured by the legitimating resonance of the word "law" that
the most important jurisprudential text for an entire generation of scholars
could assert, without irony or qualification, that "the only alternative to
regularized and peaceable [i.e., judicial] methods of decision is a disintegrating resort to violence."' 8

What is humiliation? How do we distinguish it from the related
emotions of shame and embarrassment? "Emotions, Honor, and the
Affective Life of the Heroic" lays the groundwork for answering these
questions by undertaking the daunting task of attempting to capture the
emotional flavor of life in the honor-based culture of saga Iceland. The
point of this undertaking is twofold: to clarify the profound differences in
emotional life between honor/shame and guilt/humiliation cultures, 9 and
to grapple with the serious methodological problems entailed by any
exploration of the first-person ontology of human emotional experience.20
Miller engages his audience in this enterprise through some close
readings of passages from the Icelandic sagas. These remarkable narratives
remain relatively neglected by our own literary culture, but Miller's
passionate engagement with this literature comes across in his exegesis and
draws the uninitiated reader toward the alien world that it describes. That
world was archetypal in its use of honor as a central organizing principle.
In stark contrast to our own therapeutized universe, the quintessentially
modern concept of a socially autonomous self-esteem2' is incomprehensible in an honor culture, where reputation is everything, and where to be
thought unworthy of honor by others within the validating group is the
ultimate disaster--quite literally a fate worse than death:
Your status in this group was the measure of your honor, and your
status was achieved at the expense of the other group members who
were not only your competitors for scarce honor but also the arbiters
of whether you had it or not.... The shortest road to honor was thus

18.

HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).

19. Miller notes that the classic distinction between shame and guilt cultures has been "rightly and
roundly criticized," but argues that the distinction "still captures a fundamental difference ... between
a culture in which reputation is all and one in which conscience, confession, and forgiveness play a
central role." MILLER, supra note 2, at 116.
20. "Because mental phenomena are essentially connected with consciousness, and because
consciousness is essentially subjective, it follows that the ontology of the mental is essentially a firstperson ontology. Mental states are always somebody's mental states." JOHN R. SEARLE, THE
REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 20 (1992).
21. Miller draws a characteristically vivid distinction between the meaning of shame in an honor
culture and in our own social world: "The new shame might even be seen as the linchpin of a new
politics of the antisocial, in which it is nearly supposed that a person should maintain high self-esteem
no matter how inept or offensive he or she might be." MILLER, supra note 2, at 135.
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to take someone else's, and this meant that honorable people had to
be ever-vigilant against affronts or challenges to their honor, because
challenged they would be. 2
In such a culture shame is the key regulative status or emotion,23 the
distribution of which defines the economy of honor: "Shame is, in one
sense, nothing more than the loss of honor." 24 And because that economy
tends to be zero-sum, the relatively impoverished nature of the material
economy of classic honor-based cultures only exacerbates a person's
"concern about relative ranking, and such concern quickens interest in
others and in where one stands relative to them; it prompts the5 desire to do
2
the all-consuming work of acquiring and preserving honor.,
Miller is keenly aware of how difficult it is to translate the details of
another culture's emotional life into our own terms, and much of the essay
is devoted to struggling with this issue. Although Miller acknowledges that
"with distance comes. . . a certain methodological humility," he ultimately
rebels against the particularist orthodoxy that claims to know with
confidence that we cannot with confidence know the Other.26 He is surely
right to do so, for the eternally recurring squabble between particularist and
universalist accounts of "human nature" is itself a pseudo-problem.
Although, as Saul Kripke puts it, "everything is what it is and not another
thing, 27 the fact that we can certainly recognize differences between
cultures assumes, as Miller points out, a certain degree of commonality
between the very things being differentiated from each other. Everything
will then turn on determining the extent of that "certain degree" in each
particular case; and such judgments are necessarily independent of any
theoretical precommitment to a general conceptual scheme, whether of
particularist or essentialist design.
IV
What relevance does the struggle for honor within heroic cultures have
to our own cultural practices? Miller's final two essays tie together the
apparently disparate thematic threads of the previous chapters by weaving
a historical narrative that reveals how our contemporary perceptions of
shame, humiliation, and embarrassment are rooted in the practices of

22. Id. at 116-17.
23. In saga Iceland, shame was reified and nominalized to the point where it was "conceptualized
as a thing rather than as a feeling, [yet] the sagas do on occasion describe what people felt when they
had been done a shame." Id. at 122.
24. Id. at 118.
25. Id. at 130.
26. For the orthodox particularist "[d]ifference thus becomes an essential category immediately
knowable, paradoxically, because unknowable." Id. at 197.
27.

Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE (Donald

Davidson & Gilbert Harman eds., 1971).
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predecessor cultures. Miller's central claim is that the key to understanding
the social and psychological complexity that still characterizes the most
mundane day-to-day interactions, and the accompanying perception that
"such simple interactions are fraught with danger is that we still feel the
demands of something like honor very keenly., 28 That is, we believe,
whether in a conscious or a visceral way, that we should "pay back what
we owe, whether it be good or bad" and "that it matters deeply to us...
that we acquit ourselves well with the people we encounter."29 The book
suggests that, in contrast with honor-based heroic cultures, where shame is
the emotion that does the most basic work of social ordering, our culture
typically gives this role to the set of emotions signified by the word
humiliation.
Miller's argument requires that he specify the presently delineated
boundaries between shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, and this he
sets out to do. Yet the argument never fails to remind us that all such
typologies will seem neater than the complex social reality that they try to
capture: the resulting boundaries can only be somewhat arbitrary marks on
a continuum, rather than the bright definitional lines often found in the
more reductive styles of certain contemporary social sciences. Nevertheless,
some fairly clear distinctions can be made:
(1) "Shame is the emotion of a universe that privileges ideas of honor,
reputation, and respect, a world in which the public self dwarfs the private
self. ' 30 Shame is that emotion which is "the consequence of not living up
to what we ought to;"'" to be shamed is to suffer a degradation of status
for having failed to adhere to important group norms.
(2) Humiliation, like shame, works by lowering, but this lowering
involves the deflation of pretension rather than the degradation of one's
previously legitimate niche in the social hierarchy. Humiliation is "the
consequence of trying to live up to what we have no right to. ' 32 The
pretentious academic who lectures others on subjects that they know far
better than he, the figure skater whose graceful leap ends in a ridiculous
pratfall, the socially inept high school boy who dares ask the most popular
girl in the class to the dance--each is humiliated by aspiring to a status that
he or she is unable to obtain.
(3) While shame often partakes of the tragic, and humiliation of the
darkly comic world of rough justice, embarrassment is the product of the
relatively trivial social transgression, and is therefore the stuff of light
comedy. Indeed, "it takes only a very subtle shift in context, distance, or

28.

MILLER, supra note 2, at 204.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.at 145.
Id.

432
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involvement to turn embarrassing situations 33into causes for mirth both for
observers and for the person embarrassed.
One of Miller's most powerful narrative tools is his Dostoyevskian
willingness to expose himself to his own humiliating gaze so that he might,
like Dostoyevsky's Underground Man, always be one step ahead of others
who are not as capable of perceiving his (and their own) imminent
humiliation.3 4 Consider the following account:
I was recently introduced to an academic whose work I knew.... We
shook hands. He was polite and indicated that he knew who I was,
although it was clear to me that he had never read any of my work.
...After our introduction we engaged in pleasant conversation for
some ten minutes, shook hands vigorously on parting, and gave each
other hearty farewells registering our pleasure at finally meeting.
These indications were mutual.
Then came a moment some two months later. We were in a similar
setting and I looked toward him to catch from him the indication that
a greeting was in order. He looked ever so briefly at me with the look
of one who desires to avert his gaze quickly because caught impermissibly looking at someone he did not know.... My emotion at being
so eminently forgettable was one of humiliation. It clearly was neither
shame nor embarrassment....
... I felt humiliated because I knew that he would be embarrassedif
he learned that he knew me.35
Here, we are reminded of the ability of a ruthlessly honest narration to
show us the familiar world with unusual clarity-like the lady in Anna
Karenina whose willingness simply to say what she was actually thinking
astounded the fashionable circles of St. Petersburg society so deeply that
they credited her with formulating the most brilliant aphorisms.
Note also the almost paradoxical quality of such social interchange:
Miller illustrates how humiliation, embarrassment, and shame are
quintessentially emotions that depend upon our self-regard, yet that same
self-regard is itself, to the extent that we are not psychotic, ultimately
dependent upon the social judgments of the very world from which our
self-regard attempts to insulate us. One of Humiliation's strengths is the
manner in which it reminds readers how unrealistic the cruder versions of
atomistic liberalism can be: how the social construction of reality seeps into
every corner of experience, belying the notion of the presocial self favored
by various formalistic academic disciplines.

33. Id. at 149.
34. Miller sees in Dostoyevsky's work the celebration of self-humiliation as a kind of inverse
virtue: "It is in Dostoyevsky that we find anatomized humiliation as identity, humiliation as the
substance of a kind of perverse spiritual hierarchy in which people are ranked by how obsessively selftorturing they are ....
This is the Untermensch as Obermensch." Id. at 170-72.
35. Id. at 149-50.
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How, then, can we avoid humiliation? Miller argues that we cannot, that
if we are properly socialized persons the "structural pretension" built into
many everyday social interchanges will place us in situations of ranked
social difference where we will humiliate and be humiliated merely through
the act of maintaining our social identities. Attempts at hypercorrection
(the working class person who tries to use "proper" English when talking
to a professional) or hypocorrection (the professional who inserts swear
words as rhythmic filler when speaking to working-class people) will often
only make things worse.
Humiliation then can be seen as the common currency of emotional
exchange in any society that features sufficient levels both of status
stratification and of status mobility to ensure that almost any social
situation may reveal someone as aspiring to a status he or she has not
achieved. And of course in a society as protean as the United States,
yesterday's parvenu is often today's aristocrat, and vice versa. Seen in this
light, F. Scott Fitzgerald's quip that in American lives there are no second
acts could not be more mistaken. Indeed, Miller's exploration of the
differences between heroic honor cultures and modern America suggests
that while, in the former, to be truly shamed constituted a relatively
immutable disaster, to be humiliated in contemporary America means, for
most of us, nothing more than that our work was reviewed by our employer
or that we asked someone for a date, or that we tried out for the baseball
team, etc., and that the predictable disappointments did not fail to
disappoint.
V
Ultimately, the questions that interest Miller are those difficult and
perhaps unanswerable questions that modern academic disciplines are to
some extent constructed to avoid:
What would it be like to have lived back then? Which time (place)
was the best of times, which was the worst of times? These are the
kinds of questions that drive the production of written history. Even
the most dry-as-dust professionalized historian is driven by them. The
questions are moral ones. They require us to make judgments about
the good life, about justice, about bodily security, about wealth and its
distribution. They invite us also to personalize and romanticize, to
wonder whether we would have been better or worse off then, feared
more or less, been safer, more secure, more fulfilled, less harried.36
Miller's work asks such questions directly, while never losing sight of the
sometimes insuperable methodological obstacles faced by anyone who

36.

Id. at 90.
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strives to get inside another person's head or another place's culture.
Humiliation is thus a text that pursues its quarry not so much across as
through those disciplinary distinctions-between anthropology, sociology,
linguistics, literary criticism, and social history-that might interfere with
undertaking the challenging inquiries that engage his curiosity.
Perhaps the highest compliment that can be paid to a contemporary piece
of academic writing is that we do not know what it is. In the essays that
make up Humiliation, Professor Miller is not "doing" "materialist
anthropology," or "social history," or any other sufficiently conventionalized discourse that would allow us to pigeonhole the author's work even
before reading it. Rather, he is deploying the resources of a host of
disparate disciplines in order to reveal the remarkable richness of certain
emotional experiences---emotions that help shape the words and actions of
human beings when they perform the immensely complex work of
maintaining the social worlds that they construct, and which help construct
them. In doing so, he has written a unique and valuable book.

